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NOTES
is particularly significant because it is a matter over which control may
be exercised.
Despite the questions left unanswered by the court in Ladehoff, it seems
clear that rights under section 93 of the Texas Probate Code are to be
strictly construed. Accordingly, citizens of Texas, and especially attorneys
of Texas, are now on notice that probate judgments may be subject to at-
tack until the last interested minor has passed his majority by two years.
Ellen K. Solender
The Scope of Search When Incident to a Lawful Arrest
Chimel was arrested at his home by three officers pursuant to an arrest
warrant. The officers did not have a search warrant, and asked for per-
mission to look around the house. When permission was refused they
announced that they would exercise their prerogative of conducting a
search incident to a lawful arrest. Accompanied by Chimel's wife, they
conducted a forty-five minute search of the house, attic, garage, and work-
shop. Items were seized which were later admitted into evidence at Chimel's
trial for burglary. Chimel maintained that these items were obtained in
violation of his fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.' The California supreme court rejected the claim and
upheld the search The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.'
Held, reversed: A warrantless search which goes beyond the person and
the area from which he might obtain a weapon or destructible evidence is
unreasonable under the fourth and fourteenth amendments. Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In Weeks v. United States4 the Supreme Court recognized that the
fourth amendment does not bar the search of a person legally arrested
for the purpose of discovering and seizing fruits or evidence of crime.'
Weeks was the first case to delineate a specific exception to strict fourth
amendment limitations on search.' The Weeks doctrine was extended in
1 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
268 Cal. 2d 436, 439 P.2d 333, 67 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1968).
3393 U.S. 958 (1968).
4232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5Id. at 392. This was set out in the form of judicial dicta to a decision which held that it was
a violation of the fourth amendment to break into a person's house and search through his effects
without a search warrant.
' The predicate for this was laid in Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897), where the
Court held there were "well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case." Id. at
281. For a more thorough study of the fourth amendment limitations, see N. LASSON, T14E HISTORY
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937).
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Carroll v. United States.' In Carroll the Supreme Court held that, "[W]hen
a man is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person
or in his control which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be
used to prove the offense may be seized and held as evidence in the prose-
cution."' The meaning of "in the control" was clarified two years later
in Marron v. United States.! There, federal agents with a search warrant
went to the premises of the defendant to look for liquor and articles
used in its manufacture. They searched the room and the closets, where
they found and seized a ledger dealing with illicit liquor transactions. The
Court held that although seizure of the ledger was not authorized by the
warrant it was admissible because the officers had the right to search inci-
dent to a lawful arrest and the seizure could be viewed as a product of
that search. Thus, in a matter of three years the Court extended the
spatial limitations of a search from the person to all parts of the premises
where the arrest is effected.
Contemporaneous with this development was the issue of the thorough-
ness and geographical boundaries of a search. In United States v. Kirschen-
blatt0 the argument was advanced that enforcement officials had the right
to conduct general searches incident to a lawful arrest." The standard of
"reasonableness" in conducting a search was developed in answer to this
argument; "reasonableness" was to be determined by the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case. 3 One application of this newly determined stan-
dard was in United States v. Lefkowitz. 4 In Lefkowitz the defendant was
arrested in a room where he was allegedly carrying on an illegal liquor
business. The room where the arrest took place was ten feet long, twenty
feet wide, and divided by a partition. The defendant was arrested in the
outer portion of the room, but both parts were searched intensively, and
books and papers were seized from both. The Court found that these items
were improperly admitted at the trial, holding that the authority to
search contemporaneous with an arrest is not greater than that conferred
by a search warrant specifically describing the things to be seized. More-
over, the Court held that an arrest cannot be used as a pretext to search
for evidence."' Thus, the apparent criterion for a search incident to a law-
7267 U.S. 132 (1925).
81d. at 158. The primary issue in Carroll was the validity of the arrest, but once this was
established the stated search rule was held to apply.
9 275 U.S. 192 (1927). See also Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), which firmly
established the right to search the place of the arrest.
'016 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1926).
" In Kirschenblatt the defendant's offices were searched by federal agents. The agents had a
search warrant, but the prosecution admitted that the search and subsequent seizure was not
authorized by the warrant alone. It was argued that the lawful arrest justified a search for and
seizure of, incriminating papers related to the defendant's illicit purchase of liquor. The court found
that the evidence in question was improperly seized because it was unrelated to the crime. Id. at 204.
" Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
"Id. at 357. Go-Bart also reaffirmed the decision in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298
(1921), by saying that in looking at these factors the amendment should be liberally construed.
'4285 U.S. 452 (1932).
'5 Id. at 467. In so stating, the Court leaves somewhat of an ambiguity when comparison is made
to Marron (see text accompanying notes 9-10 supra). Since Marron was not overruled the implica-
tion is that the items were of a kind that could have been seized had the search been reasonable
under the circumstances.
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ful arrest was that it could extend to all parts of the premises where the
arrest was effected if it was reasonable under the circumstances and for
something specific.
The beginning of the modern era in this area of law began in 1947 with
Harris v. United States. In Harris FBI agents had a warrant to arrest
the defendant for interstate transportation of forged checks. After the
arrest was effected in the living room of Harris' four-room apartment, a
five-hour search of the premises took place, the object being the recovery
of the checks. In the course of the search, a sealed envelope containing
altered selective service cards was found and opened. The cards were ad-
mitted into evidence to convict Harris of violating the Selective Service
and Training Act of 1940." The Court upheld the search, finding that
it was no more extensive than necessary, and that it was insignificant that
the draft cards were unrelated to the crime for which the accused was
arrested. 8 The Court further stated that if the entry was authorized and
the search valid, there is nothing in the fourth amendment which pro-
hibits the seizure of property, possession of which is a crime, even though
the officers were initially unaware that such property was on the premises.
Apparently the Court did not find the search in Harris to be a general
one because the officers began the search looking for something specific.
However, Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented, proposing that "reasonable-
ness" should not be judged with reference to a particular search but by
the historic experience of the fourth amendment. "
The Court did modify its position somewhat in Trupiano v. United
States" when it held that "in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement
agents must secure and use search warrants whenever practicable."'" This
view prevailed for barely two years before it was rejected by the Court
in United States v. Rabinowitz.' There, an arrest warrant was issued for
selling forged stamps. The defendant was arrested in his small one-room
office, and his desk, safe, and file cabinet were intensively searched as an
incident to the arrest. A number of forged stamps were seized and later ad-
mitted in evidence. In upholding the search the Court rejected the reason-
ing it used in Trupiano and said that "such searches turn upon the reason-
ableness under all the circumstances and not upon the practicability of
procuring a search warrant, for the warrant is not required."' Once again
16331 U.S. 145 (1947).
"TSelective Training & Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885, § 311 (expired 1947).
'8 33 U.S. at 154. It should be noted that the previous cases such as Carroll and Marron (see text
accompanying notes 7-10 supra) dealt with the right to seize things that could be used to prove
the crime. The inference being that this meant the crime for which the person was being arrested.
However, the question of the propriety of seizing items that could be used to prove a crime was
not dealt with.
19Id. at 162. Justice Frankfurter would prefer the Court to set a more specific guideline based
on constitutional interpretation, rather than to formulate a standard which would fluctuate from
case to case. This is opposed to the Court's decision in Go-Bart (see text accompanying notes 12-13
supra) and the idea that the Court should not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than
is required by the precise facts of the case. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 163 (1961).
20 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
21 Id. at 705. However, no guidelines were set down by the Court to determine when it would
be "practicable."
2"339 U.S. 56 (1950).
23Id. at 65, 66.
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Justice Frankfurter dissented, stating that if the police had time to obtain
a search warrant and the need for it was apparent before the arrest, the
search should not be allowed. 4 Harris and Rabinowitz represented the
state of the law until 1969.
II. CHIMEL V. CALIFORNIA: A NEw STANDARD
Speaking for the majority in Chimel, Mr. Justice Stewart held that a
search incident to a lawful arrest cannot go beyond the area within the
immediate control of the person arrested.' The Court defined this area as
that "from within which a person might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence."' A distinction should be drawn between the "area
within the immediate control of the person" that was spoken of in Chimel,
and the area "in the control of the person" as defined in Marron." Under
Marron, an entire room, including closets and desks even if thirty feet
away, were considered to be "in the control" of the accused by virtue of
the fact that he was the occupant of the premises. Chimel narrowed the
permissible area of search to one which would be within the reach of the
accused before he could be apprehended by the police. While it is difficult
to define this area in precise spatial terms, the Court's decision in Cbimel
certainly precludes the search of a closet which is closed and some distance
removed from the accused. The reasoning of the Court in establishing
the "immediate control" standard was that once the search is allowed to
go beyond this area there is no way rationally to limit its extent. Conse-
quently, the Court overruled Harris by finding that there is no justifica-
tion for searching rooms other than that in which the arrest occurs."
The Court in Chimel also rejected the idea that because a court would
have issued a search warrant the fact that one was not obtained is unim-
portant. Merely because courts have granted search warrants in similar
situations' does not mean that it is justifiable to forego this safeguard in
future cases. Nor did the Court accept the idea that a warrantless search
may be justified because of the impracticality of obtaining a warrant.
This is a direct departure from the Court's decision two years earlier in
Camara v. Municipal Court." There the Court found that peculiar cir-
cumstances making the obtaining of a search warrant highly impractical
are a significant consideration in evaluating a search under the reasonable-
2 4 d. at 85. Is there an inconsistency in Justice Frankfurter's dissents in Harris and Rabinowitz?
In Harris he does not think the facts of the particular case should be looked at, but here he is
willing to look at them to determine that the police might have had time to obtain a search
warrant.
2 395 U.S. at 763. See Scott v. State, 256 A.2d 384 (1969), where the Maryland court found
Chimel to be non-retroactive. It was stated there that the exclusion of evidence seized before
Chimel would increase the burden on the administration of justice, would overturn convictions
based on fair reliance upon pre-Chimel decisions, and would not serve to deter similar searches and
seizures in the future. Id. at 392.26 Id. at 759.
27See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
28395 U.S. at 763.
2 See People v. Alvarado, 255 Cal. App. 2d 285, 62 Cal. Rptr. 891 (Ct. App. 1967), where
there was no direct evidence that items sought were at home but warrant was issued.
as 3 8 7 U.S. 523 (1967).
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ness standard. These last two points are especially significant. In holding
as it did, the Court in Chimel took a definite turn away from the past
practice of looking at the "total atmosphere" ' of the case and deciding
that if a search warrant probably would have been issued the search may
be upheld." In Chimel the Court tried to redirect enforcement procedures
back to the use of the search warrant rather than to justify its non-use, an
approach which previous decisions had engendered.'
Chimel restricts a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest to three
situations. 4 First, an arresting officer may search the person arrested in
order to remove any weapons he might seek to use in order to resist arrest
or effect escape. Second, it is permissible to search for and seize any
evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or des-
truction. Finally, a search may go beyond the person arrested, but not
beyond the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a
weapon or evidentiary items.
I1. CONCLUSION
The decision in Chimel is an attempt to set a workable guideline for
the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest. It seems clear that the
concept of such a search has a rather nebulous base. This was recognized
by Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Rabinowitz which said that
"the right to search the place of arrest is an innovation based on confusion,
without historic foundation, and made in the teeth of a historic protection
against it.""a The fact that courts have encountered difficulty in establish-
ing what that right consists of is amply shown by the wide variety of
decisions attempting to follow the guideline of reasonableness.'
The basic difficulty is the conflict between the right of an individual to
be free from intrusion, and the right of society to maintain effective law
enforcement. The dilemma which this conflict causes was recognized by
Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Chimel. He said that he did
not know to what extent cities and towns across the nation are prepared
to administer the greatly expanded warrant system required by the de-
cision, but that he could not vote to perpetuate "bad fourth amendment
law." '7 Whether this decision requires an expanded warrant system and
a United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
"See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964), where the Court justified its holding by
saying that as much was required to support a search without a warrant as required for the issuance
of a warrant.
a" In his dissent in Chinel Justice White raises the question of whether a search warrant will
provide any more protection than the law does presently, and whether it is reasonable to request
an officer to leave the place of the arrest to go and get a search warrant, knowing that the evi-
dence present might be destroyed by another party. 395 U.S. at 774, 781.
34 Id. at 763.
3 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 78 (1950).
56In People v. Braden, 34 I1. 2d 516, 216 N.E.2d 808 (1966), the police arrested defendant in
his apartment and the search of a refrigerator and closet outside the apartment was upheld. In
Commonwealth v. Cockfield, 411 Pa. 71, 190 A.2d 898, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 920 (1963), the
police searched defendant's car 57 hours after his arrest and this was held to be incidental to the
arrest. The California court of appeals, in People v. Rodriguez, 238 Cal. App. 2d 682, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 117, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 951 (1966), held that an arrest on the outside of the house
could lend itself to a search of the inside.
37 395 U.S. at 769.
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